Despite the fact that the agency theory seeks to align the interests of the principals with those of the agents, there are concerns that shareholders use their voting rights on remuneration report judiciously. In their analysis on this issue, Monem and Ng (2013) evaluated a number of firms that had faced a “first strike” in 2011 and 2012 and observe that the shareholders have used their voting rights on remuneration reports judiciously, thus demanding the executive to achieve high performance levels. Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu (2011) support the observation by Monem and Ng (2013) in their argument that while shareholders judiciously use their voting power, this is not in regard to the executive pay but rather on the process of setting the pay. In particular, Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu (2011) reiterate that most shareholders use their voting powers to rejects proposals that impose the structure or level of pay, while selectively granting themselves the power to approve certain compensation items.
尽管代理理论试图使委托人的利益与代理人的利益相一致，但仍有人担心股东会明智地使用其薪酬报告投票权。在对这一问题的分析中，Monem和Ng（2013）评估了一些在2011年和2012年面临“罢工”的公司，并观察到股东在薪酬报告中明智地使用了投票权，因此要求高管实现高绩效水平。Ertimur、Ferri和Muslu（2011年）支持Monem和Ng（2013年）的观点，即虽然股东明智地使用了投票权，但这并不是高管薪酬，而是薪酬设定过程。特别是，Ertimur、Ferri和Muslu（2011）重申，大多数股东利用其投票权否决强加薪酬结构或水平的提案，同时有选择地授予自己批准某些薪酬项目的权力。
3.0 Discussions and Analysis 讨论和分析
An analysis of literature indicates that businesses and organisations have sought to implement different approaches in determining executive compensation. Among these is include using social performance criteria to determine CEO compensation package in 2016 (Maas, 2016). Nonetheless, Syed (2017) observes that social performance criteria in 2016 CEO compensation package creates room for the top management to engage in unethical activities such as concealing of some of financial aspects of the organisation in order receive certain benefits. In this regards, there are risks that some CEOs will invest in social responsibility programs even when the firms in question are performing poorly in order to receive benefits tied to social performance. In other words, social performance gives CEOs have an incentive to engage in unethical activities such as concealing financial weaknesses in their firms, thus increasing the risk of failure of these firms.
对文献的分析表明，企业和组织试图在确定高管薪酬时采用不同的方法。其中包括使用社会绩效标准确定2016年CEO薪酬方案（Maas，2016）。尽管如此，Syed（2017）观察到，2016年CEO薪酬方案中的社会绩效标准为高层管理人员从事不道德活动创造了空间，例如隐瞒组织的某些财务方面，以获得某些利益。在这方面，有些首席执行官可能会投资于社会责任计划，即使这些公司表现不佳，也会因此而获得与社会绩效相关的利益。换言之，社会绩效让CEO们有动机从事不道德的活动，比如隐瞒公司的财务弱点，从而增加这些公司的失败风险。
Importantly, there are number changes that relate to the executive remuneration strategy and governance framework that occurred between 2016 and 2017. To begin with, despite adopting ‘pay-performance’ link, there is evidence that indicate that top executives in Australia still earn huge wages while their organisations continue to perform poorly. Speaking from this point of view, one of the changes between 2016 and 2017 on executive remuneration strategy and governance strategy has been to introduce bespoke payment structure. In this case, rather than adopt a “one-size fits all”, organisations are fast turning to developing their own compensation strategy in order to enhance the maximisation of benefits by both principals and the agents (EY Pay Perspective, 2016). In addition to this, some organisations in Australia turned to rewarding equities rather than cash in their short-term incentive plan (Jacobs, 2017). In this case, organisations are adopting a short-term incentive (STI) plan that rewards its executives with equities rather than giving cash bonuses. On the other hand, some organisations are fast scrapping off the Long Term Incentive (LTI) as part of the executives’ remuneration. In addition, there is a significant shift in organisation where stakeholders are increasing their voice, thus giving them more power as far as governance and strategic issues are concerned (Calkoen, 2017). This means that the executives’ power to fully make decisions on issues of governance and organisational strategy is declining.
重要的是，2016年至2017年期间，高管薪酬战略和治理框架发生了大量变化。首先，尽管采用了“薪酬-绩效”联系，但有证据表明，澳大利亚的高层管理人员仍能获得巨额工资，而他们的组织仍表现不佳。从这个角度来看，2016年至2017年期间，高管薪酬战略和治理战略的变化之一是引入定制薪酬结构。在这种情况下，各组织不是采取“一刀切”的做法，而是迅速转向制定自己的薪酬战略，以促进委托人和代理人的利益更大化（安永薪酬展望，2016）。除此之外，澳大利亚的一些组织在其短期激励计划中转向奖励股票而不是现金（Jacobs，2017）。在这种情况下，企业正在采取短期激励（STI）计划，用股票而不是现金奖金奖励高管。另一方面，一些组织正在迅速取消作为高管薪酬一部分的长期激励（LTI）。此外，组织结构发生了重大变化，利益相关者增加了他们的发言权，从而在治理和战略问题上赋予了他们更多的权力（Calkoen，2017）。这意味着高管在治理和组织战略问题上充分决策的权力正在下降。
One of the critical aspects to note is the fact that the updated remuneration principles play a critical role in addressing the agency conflicts between the management and the stakeholders. On one hand, these remuneration principles are focusing on preventing the executive from taking risks that endanger the stakeholders’ investment in organisations as well as threaten the entire society. For example, through the use of equities in short-term incentives rather than cash bonuses will help improve the attachment and level of responsibility towards the organisation in question from the part of the executive. On the other hand, such compensation ensures that the executive is rewarded for their role in promoting high performance levels in the organisation in question. Therefore, conflicts that could arise because of divergent interests from both the stakeholders and the management in organisation are significantly minimized or completely eliminated.
需要注意的一个关键方面是，更新后的薪酬原则在解决管理层和利益相关者之间的机构冲突方面发挥着关键作用。一方面，这些薪酬原则的重点是防止高管承担危及利益相关者在组织中的投资以及威胁整个社会的风险。例如，通过在短期激励中使用股票而不是现金奖金，将有助于提高高管对相关组织的依恋和责任水平。另一方面，这样的薪酬确保了高管在提升相关组织的高绩效水平方面所起的作用得到奖励。因此，由于利益相关者和组织管理层的利益分歧而可能产生的冲突被大大减少或完全消除。