One of the critical issues to observe about the nature of government-business relationships in China is the fact that the massive growth of international trade and aspects such as globalization and the changing global politics had a significant impact in bringing a revolution to these relationships. For instance, Zhu (2015) observe that the end of the Cold War and the shifting of global markets from liberalism to neoliberalism economic concepts encouraged the Chinese government to focus on lessening its control over its market as way to create an avenue for its businesses to effectively compete both on the local and international markets. Furthermore, the lessening of government control over its market was perceived as a way to encourage the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and as such, position China to achieve rapid industrialization. This is affirmed by Chang (2003) who observe that the shift towards neoliberalism not only in China but also in other parts of the globe was motivated by the fact that liberalism had proved to be inefficient and incapable of promoting economic growth, with countries that held onto this ideology experiencing significant stagnation in their economic growth and development journey. Speaking from this point of view, it is clear that China government-business relations have been dynamic in nature, and continues to respond to global influence.
关于中国政企关系的性质，需要观察的关键问题之一是，国际贸易的大规模增长以及全球化和不断变化的全球政治等方面对这些关系带来了一场革命，产生了重大影响。例如，朱（2015）观察到，冷战的结束以及全球市场从自由主义经济概念向新自由主义经济概念的转变促使中国政府将重点放在减少对其市场的控制上，以此为其企业创造一条在本地和国际市场上有效竞争的途径。此外，减少政府对其市场的控制被视为鼓励外国直接投资流入的一种方式，从而使中国能够实现快速工业化。Chang（2003）证实了这一点，他观察到，不仅在中国，而且在全球其他地区，向新自由主义的转变是由自由主义被证明效率低下且无法促进经济增长这一事实所推动的，坚持这一意识形态的在其经济增长和发展历程中经历了重大停滞。从这个角度讲，很明显，中国政府与商界的关系一直是动态的，并继续受到全球影响。
The government-business relations in China fall into two main categories namely the local government-business relations and the national government-business relations. In reference to Wang (2016), more firms in China have strong connections with the local government as compared with the national government. Deng and Kennedy (2010) attribute this connection between local government and businesses to the fact that most businesses operate in a single locality and as such, they have no need to establish a connection to the national government. In other words, the main factor that limits most businesses from seeking to establish a relationship with the national government is embedded in the fact that they are limited geographically as far as their operations are concerned. With this in mind, these businesses expect that by establishing relations with the local government, they would be able to easily access different trade opportunities that arise within their localities.
中国的政府业务关系分为两大类，即地方政府业务关系和政府业务关系。参考Wang（2016），与政府相比，中国更多的公司与地方政府有着紧密的联系。邓和肯尼迪（2010）将地方政府和企业之间的这种联系归因于这样一个事实，即大多数企业在一个地方运营，因此，它们不需要与政府建立联系。换句话说，限制大多数企业寻求与政府建立关系的主要因素在于，就其运营而言，它们的地理位置有限。考虑到这一点，这些企业希望通过与当地政府建立关系，他们能够轻松获得当地出现的不同贸易机会。
Whereas this is the case, over the past few years there have been significant growth in the number of businesses that have sought to establish relations with the national government. According to Wang (2016), the growing need to establish relations with the national government among businesses is motivated by the fact that such relations enable businesses to access opportunity both across the nation as well as on international scene. In this case, by establishing a relation with the national government, a business has an opportunity to transcend both local and international borders and as such, achieve growth and expansion to other markets. In addition, Wang (2016) observes that national government-business relations are more powerful as compared to local government-business relations and as such, they are more desirable. Furthermore, the Chinese local government officials are often transferred to other locations, thus undermining the stability of the local government-business relations. As such, most businesses are turning to the national government since it provides stable government-business relations.
尽管如此，在过去几年中，寻求与政府建立关系的企业数量大幅增长。Wang（2016）表示，企业与政府建立关系的需求日益增长，这是因为这种关系使企业能够在全国以及国际舞台上获得机会。在这种情况下，通过与政府建立关系，企业有机会超越当地和国际边界，从而实现增长和向其他市场扩张。此外，Wang（2016）观察到，与地方政府业务关系相比，政府业务关系更强大，因此更可取。此外，中国地方政府官员经常被调到其他地方，从而破坏了地方政府业务关系的稳定。因此，大多数企业都求助于政府，因为它提供稳定的政府-企业关系。
Despite the fact that China has embraced neoliberalism ideologies in managing its government-business relations, there is a need to observe that there is still some level of government influence over businesses within its economy, particularly, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In reference to Zhang (2018), despite the fact that the Chinese government has increased the autonomy of SOEs in managing their operations and activities, there is a need to observe that it still regulates them through the ‘nomenklatura system’ whereby the state is involved in the appointment of the top leadership such as the presidents and the chairmen of these enterprises. Speaking from this point of view, one of the questions that arise regards who is in control of state-owned enterprises in China. Arguably, despite claims that the state has reduced its influence on government-business relations in China, it is clear from the analysis of the SOEs’ top leadership that the state and particularly, the political elites are in control of these enterprises in this nation. This is affirmed by Zhang (2018) who observe that the Communist Party of China is mandated with the appointment of the top leadership of these enterprises, and as such, it only appoints its ‘own people’ to lead its SOEs, thus gaining control over them. However, it is important to mention such control does not extend to privately owned enterprises but rather is not limited to SOEs. This implies that private businesses in this nation enjoy a significant portion of freedom from government control.
尽管中国在管理其政府与企业的关系时采用了新自由主义意识形态，但仍有必要观察到，政府对其经济中的企业，特别是国有企业，仍有一定程度的影响力。关于Zhang（2018），尽管中国政府增加了国有企业在经营和活动管理方面的自主权，需要注意的是，它仍然通过“Nomenklatara制度”对这些企业进行监管，参与任命这些企业的总裁和董事长等更高领导层。从这个角度讲，出现的问题之一是谁控制了中国的国有企业。可以说，尽管有人声称降低了其对中国政企关系的影响，但从国有企业更高领导人的分析中可以清楚地看出，，特别是政治精英控制着中国的这些企业。张（2018）证实了这一点，他观察到，中国共产党被授权任命这些企业的更高领导人，因此，它只任命“自己的人”领导国有企业，从而获得对它们的控制权。然而，值得一提的是，这种控制并不延伸到私营企业，而是不限于国有企业。这意味着这个的私营企业在很大程度上不受政府控制。