One of the questions that often emerge regards whether this stock market crash could have been prevented. In reference to Arbel, Carvell and Postnieks (1988), there is evidence that points to the fact that despite the existence of signs that the risks on the financial markets were increasing rapidly due to the slowing United States economy and the persistent inflation, which created a scenario where companies gained significantly higher valuations than their actual value, different market players ignored such warning signs. The confidence of different market players was further enhanced by the fact that computerised trading systems were fast taking shape on the stock market, and it was believed that they could not fail. In this case, the market players assumed that with such systems in place, there was no need to intervene on different market warnings since these systems were expected to intervene on their behalf. However, Solomon and Dicker (1988) point out that these trading programs had not been tested to establish how they would respond in the market in the event of a crash had never been tested. Therefore, with a higher level of trust in these trading programs and their capability to avert any losses in the event of market volatility, different market players took higher risks that endangered the actual market. speaking from this point of view, there is a need to observe that up to this day, the trading programs are largely blamed for the Wall Street Crash of 1987, while human beings who engaged in high risk trading behaviour as well as ignored some of the warning signs that could have helped prevent the crash or lessen its impact in case it happened are often perceived as not the cause of this stock market crash.
经常出现的问题之一是，这场股市崩盘是否可以避免。关于Arbel、Carvell和Postnieks（1988年），有证据表明，尽管存在迹象表明，由于美国经济放缓和持续通货膨胀，金融市场的风险正在迅速增加，这造成了一种情况，即公司的估值远远高于其实际价值，而不同的市场参与者忽视了此类警告信号。不同市场参与者的信心因计算机化交易系统在股票市场上迅速形成而进一步增强，人们相信它们不会失败。在这种情况下，市场参与者认为，有了这样的系统，就没有必要对不同的市场警告进行干预，因为预期这些系统会代表他们进行干预。然而，Solomon和Dicker（1988）指出，这些交易程序还没有经过测试，以确定它们在市场崩溃时会如何反应，也没有经过测试。因此，由于对这些交易计划的信任度更高，并且有能力在市场波动时避免任何损失，不同的市场参与者承担了更高的风险，从而危及实际市场。从这个角度讲，有必要观察到，到目前为止，1987年华尔街崩盘主要归咎于交易计划，虽然从事高风险交易行为的人以及忽视一些可能有助于防止崩盘或在崩盘发生时减轻其影响的警告信号的人通常被认为不是此次股市崩盘的原因。
There are a number of critical lessons that emerge from the 1987 Wall Street Crash. To begin with, there is a need for human beings to take an active role in monitoring different elements in order to detect warning signs of problems that are likely to occur in future. In this case, despite the economic warnings, financial trading firms were unwilling to take a cautious approach to the market, thus increasing the risks of a greater impact in case the market crashed. Similarly, there is a need to observe that whereas a particular system may be effective and infallible, such a system needs constant monitoring and evaluation to ensure that it does not cause unforeseen problems in future. For example, suppose the trading managers had failed to put their full trust in the trading system, they would have reduced the trading risks they engaged in. Lastly, there is a need to thoroughly test a system from different perspectives and against different conditions before declaring it infallible. For instance, if the creators of the trading programs had tested these programs in different conditions including cases where the market places thousands of orders simultaneous, they would have established how such a system behaves in case of a market failure and as such, establish ways to ensure the programs does not worsen the situation.
从1987年的华尔街崩盘中，我们得到了许多重要的教训。首先，人类需要在监测不同要素方面发挥积极作用，以便发现未来可能出现的问题的警告信号。在这种情况下，尽管有经济警告，但金融交易公司不愿对市场采取谨慎态度，从而增加了在市场崩溃时受到更大影响的风险。同样，需要注意的是，尽管一个特定的系统可能是有效的和无误的，但这种系统需要不断的监测和评估，以确保它不会在未来造成不可预见的问题。例如，假设交易经理没有完全信任交易系统，他们就会降低所从事的交易风险。最后，在宣布系统无误之前，需要从不同角度和不同条件对其进行彻底测试。例如，如果交易程序的创造者在不同的条件下测试了这些程序，包括市场同时发出数千份订单的情况，他们就可以确定这样一个系统在市场失灵的情况下的行为，从而确定确保程序不会使情况恶化的方法。