Table of Contents 目录
1.0 Introduction 导言
2.0 Theory and Literature Review 理论与文献综述
3.0 Discussions and Analysis 讨论和分析
4.0 Recommendation 建议
References 参考文献
1.0 Introduction 导言
Executive pay in businesses and organisations in Australia continues to attract significant attention from different stakeholders as well as from government regulating agencies. While there are arguments that the executive’s huge compensation in businesses and organisations is justified, critics think that the executive has no right to receive huge compensation packages since this is not in best interests of stakeholders. Critics justify their position in their argument that even when an organisation is performing poorly, the executive would still demand huge compensation package (Vemala, Nguyen, Dung & Kommasani, 2014). This paper explores the relationship between executive pay and the performance-pay link. In particular, the paper examines the emerging executive compensation packages that were paid out in 2016 and 2017. Through this analysis of compensation packages, the paper will make recommendations on the most appropriate executive compensation package for AGL Energy.
澳大利亚企业和组织的高管薪酬继续受到不同利益相关者以及政府监管机构的高度关注。尽管有人认为，高管在企业和组织中的巨额薪酬是合理的，但批评者认为，高管无权获得巨额薪酬，因为这不符合利益相关者的更佳利益。批评者在他们的论点中证明了他们的立场，即即使一个组织表现不佳，高管仍会要求巨额薪酬（Vemala，Nguyen，Dung&Kommasani，2014）。本文探讨了高管薪酬与绩效薪酬之间的关系。特别是，本文考察了2016年和2017年发放的新兴高管薪酬方案。通过对薪酬方案的分析，本文将为AGL Energy提出最合适的高管薪酬方案。
2.0 Theory and Literature Review 理论与文献综述
Over the last 10 years, there have been numerous debates on the role that executive compensation played in either contributing or exacerbating the 2007/08 global financial crisis. As a result of concerns that huge executive compensation packages could undermine the interests of shareholders, most organisations across the globe are increasingly focusing introducing packages that are tied to the performance of the executive. There are a number of theories that have been formulated to explain the increase in executive compensation and ‘pay-performance’ link. One of these theories is the agency theory. In reference to Bosse and Phillips (2016), the agency theory postulates that the principals, that is the stakeholders, often seen to influence the agents, that is the management, in order to reduce or eliminate the costs that could be passed on to the principal and/or the society.
在过去10年中，关于高管薪酬在促成或加剧2007/08年全球金融危机中所起的作用，存在着无数的争论。由于担心巨额高管薪酬可能损害股东利益，全球大多数组织越来越关注引入与高管业绩挂钩的薪酬。有许多理论已经被用来解释高管薪酬增长与“薪酬-绩效”之间的联系。其中一个理论是代理理论。参考Bosse和Phillips（2016），代理理论假设委托人，即利益相关者，通常被视为影响代理人，即管理层，以减少或消除可能转嫁给委托人和/或社会的成本。
Importantly, the agency theory emphasise the fact that the interests of stakeholders and the management do not converge but rather diverge. In their analysis, Pouryousefi and Frooman (2017) observe that this theory is founded on the arguments that managers are more risk averse as compared to stakeholders, different players are bounded rational, and that both the principals and the agents are self-interested. With this in mind, there is an agreement among researchers and scholars that the agency theory seeks to align the interest of both stakeholders and the executive (Nyberg et al., 2018). Arguing from this point of view, the agency theory seeks to promote the fact that when the executive is likely to receive a higher pay as a reward for better performance and punishment in form of low pay or even loss of employment in case of low performance levels.
重要的是，代理理论强调利益相关者和管理层的利益不是趋同而是分歧。在他们的分析中，Pouryousefi和Frooman（2017）观察到，这一理论的基础是，与利益相关者相比，管理者更厌恶风险，不同的参与者是有限理性的，委托人和代理人都是自利的。有鉴于此，研究人员和学者一致认为，代理理论旨在协调利益相关者和高管的利益（Nyberg et al.，2018）。从这一观点出发，代理理论试图促进这样一个事实，即当高管可能因表现更好而获得更高的薪酬时，以及在表现水平较低的情况下以低薪酬甚至失业的形式受到惩罚。